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NEW PARADIGMS FOR THE JUS AD BELLUM?
JANE

E.

STROMSETH*

I am delighted to be here today to honor Ed Cummings, a wonderful colleague and a source of great wisdom for so many of us. I
first worked with Ed in the Legal Adviser's Office in the late 1980s.
More than fifteen years later, Ed is still the person I turn to for
insight on the most difficult issues in the law of armed conflict.
Most memorably of all, while serving at the National Security
Council in 1999, I worked closely with Ed in achieving an important treaty milestone: the Procotol restricting the use of child
soldiers in armed conflict (the Child Soldier Protocol). 1 Ed was
the person who first saw the potential for a diplomatic compromise
that became the essence of the treaty: namely, allowing voluntary
recruitment of seventeen year olds into national armed forces (an
important equity for the United States) but barring their deployment into active participation in hostilities prior to the age of eighteen.2 This compromise allowed for an international agreement
that put the spotlight where it ought to be-on prohibiting the
forced recruitment and deployment of underage kids-while also
setting a clear age-eighteen standard for participation in hostilities.
Ed's efforts over many years to achieve this result illustrate several characteristics of his work as a lawyer that I admire most: his
savvy understanding of how legal rules work in complex and difficult circumstances; his appreciation for how sensible legal
*

Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. D. Phil. 1988, Oxford Uni-

versity; J.D. 1987, Yale Law School; B.A. 1978, Swarthmore College.
1. See Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, G.A. Res. 54/263, Annex I, U.N. Doc A/RES/
54/263 (May 25, 2000) (entered into force Feb. 12, 2002) [hereinafter Optional Protocol].
The United States is a party to the Optional Protocol.
2. More precisely, Article 1 of the Optional Protocol requires states parties to "take
all feasible measures to ensure that members of their armed forces who have not attained
the age of 18 years do not take a direct part in hostilities." Id. art 1. Article 2 prohibits
states parties from compulsory recruitment into their armed forces of those under eighteen, while Article 3 provides that the age for voluntary recruitment into national armed
forces must be above age fifteen. See id. arts. 2-3; see also id.pmbl. Article 4 provides that
"[a] rmed groups that are distinct from the armed forces of a State should not, under any
circumstances, recruit or use in hostilities persons under the age of 18 years" and requires
states parties to "take all feasible measures to prevent such recruitment and use ....
" Id.
art. 4.
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frameworks can safeguard U.S. security interests and advance U.S.
values (such as humanity in warfare) in a dangerous world; and his
diplomatic skill in finding reasonable common ground that protects U.S. equities while taking into account the perspectives and
legitimate concerns of others.
These virtues (practical savvy, appreciation of the value of sensible legal rules, and a capacity to find reasonable common ground)
are just what we need today for thinking through the current challenges to the jus ad bellum-the legal framework governing the
resort to force.
I will argue that the existing UN Charter framework is under
considerable stress; that neither highly restrictive nor highly permissive interpretations of the UN Charter are wise or compelling;
that updated understandings rather than completely new paradigms are needed; and that finding some common ground, particularly concerning anticipatory self-defense in response to
terrorism, is desirable and should be possible-but it will not be
easy.
The UN Charter has been the centerpiece of the jus ad bellum
since 1945. With the overarching purpose of protecting international peace and security, the Charter establishes principles limiting the use of force, including the core non-intervention norm set
forth in Article 2(4), which provides that states "shall refrain ...
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." 3
But the Charter's drafters also clearly understood that rules governing the use of force were insufficient without an enforcement
mechanism that could draw upon the military and economic
resources of the great powers, whose forces together had been necessary to defeat Hitler. Thus the Charter gave a body of states-the
Security Council-primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security and empowered it, in Chapter VII, to
respond, with force if necessary, not only to breaches of the peace
and aggression but also to threats to the peace. These terms were
deliberately left undefined so that the Council could respond flexibly to concrete circumstances. 4 The Charter also clearly affirmed
the right of states to take immediate action in self-defense, confirming, in Article 51, that: "Nothing in the present Charter shall
3.
4.

U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
See id. art. 39. For a discussion of the history of Chapter VII, see
A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER 464-65, 669-72 (1958).
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impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if
an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations
....
The Charter, in short, provides for the lawful use of force in
two clear situations: when authorized by the Security Council or in
self-defense.
Although a product of its time, the UN Charter was expected to
be a living document that could endure and adapt in new and
unforeseen circumstances. Britain's Lord Halifax perhaps put it
best in 1945, when he stressed that:
[I]nstead of trying to govern the actions of the members and
the organs of the United Nations by precise and intricate codes
of procedure, we have preferred to lay down purposes and principles under which they are to act. And by that means, we hope
to insure that they act in conformity with the express desires of
the nations assembled here, while, at the same time, we give
them freedom to accommodate their actions to circumstances
which today no man can foresee. ... We do not want to lay
down rules which may, in the future,
be the signpost for the
6
guilty and a trap for the innocent.
Yet despite its ambitious goals, the UN Charter system is under
great stress today. To be sure, Cold War antagonisms limited the
Security Council's effectiveness for much of its history. But during
the 1990s, effective U.S. diplomacy following Iraq's 1990 invasion
of Kuwait-and the Security Council's role in authorizing a collective response to that and subsequent conflicts-deepened public
and official support in many states for working within the UN
Charter system to respond to a diverse array of threats to international peace and security. Likewise, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks,
the United States worked effectively to build international support
for the U.S. military response against Al Qaeda and the Taliban
regime in Afghanistan, and for counter-terrorism efforts more generally, and the Security Council rose to the occasion, condemning
the terrorist attacks, affirming the right of self-defense, and imposing far-reaching counter-terrorism duties on all states. 7 But strains
in the UN system were also evident during these years, as the Security Council's inability to agree on effective action in Rwanda and
5. U.N. Charter art. 51.
6. Lord Halifax, Verbatim Minutes of First Meeting of Commission 1, June 14, 1945, U.N.
Doc. 1006 (June 15, 1945), in UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION: SELECTED DOCUMENTS 529, 537 (1946).
7. Security Council Resolution 1368 affirmed the inherent right of self-defense, as
did Resolution 1373, which also imposed significant counter-terrorism duties on all states.
See S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001); S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/
RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
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Kosovo made clear. Moreover, the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq in
2003, following a bruising failure to achieve consensus in the
Security Council, left a particularly deep and bitter divide, which,
in the face of ongoing turmoil in Iraq, has undermined confidence
in U.S. global leadership, even among close allies.
What is striking today, regarding the jus ad bellum, is the intensity
of feeling at two sides of a wide gulf. At one end of the chasm are
those who argue for an extremely restrictive interpretation of the
UN Charter's rules: namely, that in the absence of Security Council
authorization, states can use force in self-defense if and only if an
armed attack occurs. Proponents of this view generally reject any
conception of anticipatory self-defense under the UN Charterthat is, the use of force to thwart an imminent attack 8-or any
claim of legal authority for humanitarian intervention without
express Security Council approval even in the most exceptional of
circumstances. While most proponents of this position defend
strict rules as necessary to protect the peace-and criticize states
harshly for failing to live up to them-other advocates of strict
interpretation argue that the law of the UN Charter is in fact
"dead" because it does not reflect how states actually behave in the
world. 9 Either way, the Charter's rules are interpreted in an
extremely restrictive manner that is too narrow in the face of new
threats and that takes insufficient account of the system's capacity
to adapt.
On the other side of the current chasm are those who argue for
an extremely permissive interpretation of the UN Charter or, at
the far end, those who reject the idea of international law as a legitimate constraint on the use of force altogether. There is certainly a
wide range of views within the U.S. government today, and some
interpretations of "preemptive" self-defense, especially in response
to terrorism, fall within a reasonable conception of anticipatory
self-defense; but other interpretations, spelled out in Bush Administration speeches and the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy, are
couched in such broad terms as to suggest a willingness to use
force to prevent "rogue" states from acquiring weapons of mass
8. For a discussion of different views on anticipatory self-defense, see ANTHONY
CLARK AREND & ROBERTJ. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 71-79 (1993);
Terrence Taylor, The End of Imminence, WASH. Q., Autumn 2004, at 57, 63-65; Sean D.
Murphy, The Doctrine of Preemptive Self-Defense, 50 VILL. L. REv. 699 (2005).
9. See, e.g., Michael J. Glennon, How InternationalRules Die, 93 GEo.L.J. 939 (2005)
[hereinafter Rules]; Michael J. Glennon, Why the Security Council Failed, FOREIGN AFF., May/
June 2003, at 16, 16-18, 24. Glennon argues that even if an international norm is no
longer law, it may "still influence state conduct." Rules, supra, at 961.
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destruction"' and to preempt "emerging threats before they are
fully formed.""1 This conception of the preemptive use of force is
open-ended and difficult to reconcile with longstanding interpretations, including by the United States itself, of the scope of the right
of self-defense. 12 An expansive preemption doctrine is potentially
destabilizing and in tension with the UN Charter framework.
But do the UN Charter's rules, reasonably interpreted, still serve
a valuable purpose? And does continued commitment to that
framework serve U.S. interests in the dangerous post-9/11 world? I
would strongly argue yes to both questions for three reasons:
First, the non-intervention default rule at the heart of the UN
Charter is a force for stability in a dangerous world. Despite disagreements around the edges, Article 2(4)'s central core makes it
clear that wars of territorial expansion and conquest are unlawful.
Beyond this, the Charter framework puts a high burden ofjustification on those who would use force-a burden that encourages
states to seek to resolve disputes without resorting to armed conflict in a world chock full of grievances. Such a regime provides a
positive force for global stability as part of a broader array of pressures, such as alliances and security arrangements.
Second, the Charter framework provides a basis for mobilizing
international support for effective responses to serious threats,
such as terrorism. At a time when terrorist networks, such as Al
Qaeda, deliberately target civilians and challenge the very foundation of international law and order, the Charter provides a framework of agreed international rules that can help forge unified
responses that enjoy broad legitimacy. Other states are more likely
to cooperate in countering terrorism through actions including
the use of force if they are convinced such actions rest on a solid
10. See NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 13-14 (Sept.
17, 2002) [hereinafter NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY], available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/nsc/nss.pdf; President George W. Bush, Commencement Address at the United States
Military Academy in West Point (June 1, 2002), in 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 944 (June
10, 2002).
11.
12.

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 10, intro.
For a more extended discussion, see Jane E. Stromseth, Law and Force After Iraq: A

TransitionalMoment, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 628, 635-36 (2003) [hereinafter Law and Force]. See
also Miriam Sapiro, Iraq: The Shifting Sands of Preemptive Self-Defense, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 599
(2003). The newly-released 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy has a somewhat different
tone than the 2002 version and emphasizes a "strong preference" for "address[ing]
proliferation concerns through international diplomacy in concert with key allies and
regional partners." NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 23
(March 16, 2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006. The 2006 strategy also states, however, that "[t]he place of preemption in our national security strategy
remains the same." Id.
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legal basis; thus, pursuing U.S. objectives within the Charter framework can be a "force multiplier" that enhances access to additional
resources and support. Working within an agreed legal framework
also helps to bolster a global consensus that de-legitimizes and stigmatizes terrorist violence.
A third reason why continued commitment to the UN Charter
framework is in U.S. interests is the capacity of the framework to
adapt and evolve in the face of new threats and challenges, just as
Lord Halifax envisioned back in 1945. In recent years, for example, the Security Council has determined that "threats to the
peace" include: humanitarian emergencies; overthrow of democratically-elected leaders; extreme repression of civilian populations and cross-border refugee flows threatening regional security;
and failure to hold perpetrators of major atrocities accountable.
Another example is the Security Council's unanimous affirmation
of the right of self-defense in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11
13
attacks and the invocation of collective self-defense by U.S. allies.
Article 51, after all, refers to "armed attacks" broadly, without limit14
ing what these might look like or who might perpetrate them.
The real challenge is whether UN member states can agree on
how to interpret the Charter's rules in a context in which non-state
terrorist actors seek weapons of mass destruction with the aim of
committing devastating attacks on civilian populations, and also in
a context in which many individuals and groups suffer gross atrocities at the hands of repressive state leaders and rebel groups.
In the Child Soldier Protocol,' 5 Ed Cummings managed to find
reasonable common ground, protecting U.S. equities while constructively taking the perspectives of others into account. Is it possible to do this regarding the jus ad bellum, despite the great divide
between those at the far ends of the spectrum? I think it is.
Rather than pressing an open-ended and controversial preemption doctrine, the United States should work with friends and
allies to forge greater consensus on a robust right of self-defense
13. SeeS.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001). In addition, members
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Rio Pact, as well as Australia
under the Australia, New Zealand, and United States Security Treaty (ANZUS), invoked
the collective self-defense provisions of their respective alliances in response to the September 11 th attacks. See North American Treaty Organization (NATO), Statement by the North
Atlantic Council (Sept. 12, 2001), 40 I.L.M. 1267 (2001); Organization of American States
(OAS), Resolution on Terrorist Threat to the Americas (Sept. 21, 2001), 40 I.L.M. 1273 (2001);
Howard Government Invokes ANZUS Treaty (Sept. 14, 2001), http://www.australianpolitics.
com/new/2001/01-09-14c.shtml.
14. U.N. Charter art. 51.
15. Optional Protocol, supra note 1.
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(including anticipatory self-defense) in response to terrorism. Al
Qaeda's horrific attacks of 9/11, and the organization's determination to attack again with even more deadly effect, make the right to
defend against and thwart future attacks clear and compelling.16
Even regarding other terrorist groups not directly involved in 9/
11, the United States can expect considerable support from friends
and allies for a reasonably defined right of anticipatory selfdefense. The Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change-a diverse group from a wide range of countries-embraced anticipatory self-defense to imminent attacks as
consistent with international law, as have a number of key U.S.
allies.17
This is for good reason. Although scholars have long debated
the scope of the right of self-defense, the stronger argument, in my
view, is that Article 51 preserved the pre-existing customary law
18
right of anticipatory self-defense in the face of imminent attacks.
Moreover, subsequent practice-including responses of Security
Council members to various uses of force-indicates considerable
acceptance, at least in principle, of the Caroline standard, with its
emphasis on imminent harm. 19 Furthermore, if the law is to be
respected and taken seriously by those who face grave threats, it
must permit reasonable responses to those threats in light of the
often difficult circumstances in which decision-makers make tough
choices-something the law of armed conflict has long sought to
do.
But the meaning of "imminent" attack that is central to accepted
understandings of anticipatory self-defense needs greater clarifica16. SeeJack M. Beard, America's New War on Terrror: The Casefor Self-Defense Under International Law, 25 HAR. J.L. & PUB. POL'v 559 (2002) (discussing the 9/11 attacks and the
U.S. and international response).
17. See Report of the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges,
and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, 1 188 (2004) [hereinafter HighLevel Panel Report] ("(A] threatened State, according to long established international
law, can take military action as long as the threatened attack is imminent, no other means
would deflect it and the action is proportionate."), available at http://www.un.org/secure
world.
18. See Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1620,
1634-35 (1984) (arguing that a right of anticipatory self-defense to imminent attack is
consistent with Article 51 of the UN Charter).
19. See Christopher Greenwood, InternationalLaw and Pre-Emptive Use of Force: Afghanistan, AI-Qaida, and Iraq, 4 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 7, 12-15 (2003). In the case of the Caroline,
U.S. Secretary of State Webster defended a right of anticipatory self-defense when there
was "a necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no
moment for deliberation." Id. at 13 (discussing the Caroline case and Webster
correspondence).
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tion in the context of terrorism, and the United States should work
with allies to build agreed understandings. The key point to keep
in mind here is that the UN Charter aimed to strike a balance: to
limit pretextual and open-ended claims of self-defense that
threatened the very idea of limits on the use of force, on the one
hand, while affirming the "inherent right" of states to defend
themselves effectively from attack, in full recognition that collective
action by the Security Council would not always be timely.
Among the factors to consider in determining whether a terrorist attack is sufficiently imminent to justify forcible action in selfdefense are: (1) the intent of the terrorist group and the
probability of attack (have they made clear their determination to
attack and is there reliable intelligence to suggest they are planning to attack?); (2) capacity (what is their capacity to attack, and
are they on the verge of acquiring weapons of mass destruction?);
(3) methods of attack (terrorists use deception and stealth and
there will likely be no advance warning; thus waiting until an attack
is underway will be too late for effective self-defense); (4) gravity of
likely harm (given what is known about the terrorists' intent and
capacity, what is the likely harm expected from an attack?); and (5)
urgency of the threat (is there good reason to believe that the likelihood of attack is increasing, and that acting now is critical to
thwarting an attack?). Legal scholars have begun to discuss these
and other factors in helpful ways2 0 -including the limiting principles of necessity and proportionality of response-but more effort
is needed by lawyers, both in and out of government, in countries
around the world. The United States should be working with its
allies to lead the way.
One particularly challenging issue that arises in using force in
self-defense against terrorists is the question of state responsibility.
State involvement in terrorist acts can fall on a wide spectrum ranging from active state sponsorship and support, at one end, to state
toleration of the presence of terrorist bases of operation, to a lack
of state complicity but an inability to effectively stop terrorist
attacks from its territory at the other end of the spectrum. The
greater the degree of state involvement, the more international
support is likely for using military force in self-defense. In the case
of Afghanistan, for instance, the Taliban regime's refusal to comply
with the Security Council's repeated resolutions calling for Bin
20. See, e.g., id. at 16 (discussing "gravity of the threat" and "the method of delivery of
the threat"); Taylor, supra note 8, at 66 (discussing "the explicit intent of those posing the
threat").
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Laden to be turned over, and the regime's continued allowance of
the use of its territory as a base for Al Qaeda attacks, made the
resort to force necessary in self-defense. Even in cases where a state
is not itself complicit but is unable to halt terrorist attacks against
another state mounted from its territory, military action in selfdefense might be necessary if cooperative law enforcement means
are unable to thwart terrorist attacks. 2' The question of "necessity"
of use of force in the face of anticipated terrorist attacks will
depend very much on the particular factual circumstances and the
prospects for preventing attacks through cooperative law
enforcement.
In short, rather than pressing an expansive and open-ended preemption doctrine, the United States should work with friends and
allies to find common ground on the contours of a robust right of
self-defense (including anticipatory self-defense) focused especially
on the threat of terrorism. Regional self-defense alliances, such as
22
ANZUS and NATO, would be good places to start this diplomacy.
These alliances involve both a normative commitment to collective
self-defense and an institutional structure to implement and
enforce this commitment. Moreover, allies such as Australia and
Britain, who have themselves experienced terrorist attacks, are
likely to be interested in forging agreed understandings on selfdefense in response to terrorism. Finding common ground with
key allies in self-defense alliances could be a first step in reinforcing the jus ad bellum at a difficult and critical time, and would not
depend on achieving complete agreement among far more disparate states.
Of course, military means are only one part of a larger strategy to
counter terrorism. The United States must pursue a multi-faceted
approach that includes intelligence and law enforcement cooperation, political pressure, economic and other reforms. In addition,
the United States should work to reinforce the duty of all states to
combat terrorism and to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons
21.

SeeYoRAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE 194-96 (3d ed. 2001).

22. As mentioned earlier, the members of NATO, and Australia under ANZUS,
invoked their respective collective self-defense provisions following the 9/11 attacks. See
supra note 13. The ANZUS security alliance originally involved Australia, New Zealand,
and the United States. Today, however, it involves active defense commitments only
between Australia and the United States. In 1986, following disagreements between the
United States and New Zealand over New Zealand's stance on nuclear warships in its ports,
the United States suspended its obligations to New Zealand under the treaty. New Zealand's role is therefore best described as "dormant." Luke Peter, New Zealand's Dormant
Role in ANZUS Unchanged Since 80s-PM, CHRISTCHURCH PRESS, Sept. 20, 2001, at 3.
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of mass destruction. States have a clear legal duty not to allow terrorists to use their territory as a base for attacking other states, and
Security Council Resolution 1373, adopted after the 9/11 attacks,
imposed additional far-reaching counter-terrorism duties upon all
states. That resolution obligates all states to:
Refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to
entities or persons involved in terrorist acts.... Take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts.... Deny
safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts.... [and] Prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate
or commit terrorist acts from using their respective territories
for those purposes against other States or their citizens .... 23
More should be done to build upon Security Council Resolution
1373, which requires states to "eliminat[e] the supply of weapons
to terrorists," and also to strengthen the capacity of the Counter24
Terrorism Committee to monitor and enforce these duties.
Efforts to find common ground on state duties-despite some
differences over the jus ad bellum rules governing the resort to
force-are also evident in the area of humanitarian intervention.
The legality of humanitarian intervention-the use of force by a
state or group of states to protect the population of another state
from atrocities or other severe human rights abuses-was sharply
contested in 1999 when NATO intervened in Kosovo. Again, a
stark divide developed between those who criticized NATO's intervention as a violation of the Charter's non-intervention rules and
those who contended that, under the exceptional factual circumstances at the time, the intervention was lawful or at least legitimate. By a vote of twelve to three, the UN Security Council
soundly rejected a resolution condemning the intervention, 25 and
many members concluded, as NATO did, that force was necessary
26
and justified in these exceptional circumstances.
In the aftermath of the Kosovo intervention, the status of
humanitarian intervention without prior Security Council authori2(a)-(d), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
23. S.C. Res. 1373,
24. Id. 2(a); Jane E. Stromseth, The Security Council's Counter-TerrorismRole: Continuity
and Innovation, 97 AM. Soc'v INT'L L. PROC. 41 (2003). For a more recent development,
see S.C. Res. 1540, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (April 28, 2004).
25. The meeting record describing the Security Council's rejection of U.N. Doc. S/
1999/328 on March 26, 1999 is contained in U.N. Doc. S/PV.3989. Both documents are
available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/scact1999.htm (last visited Feb. 5,
2006).
26. For a more detailed discussion, see Jane Stromseth, Rethinking HumanitarianIntervention: The Casefor Incremental Change [hereinafter Rethinking], in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITIcAL DiLEMMAs 232, 234-40 (J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert 0.
Keohane eds., 2003).
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zation remains deeply contested. Still, there are some signs of norFor one thing, states are increasingly
mative evolution.
recognizing that they have a responsibility to protect their citizens
from severe atrocities and human rights abuses. The Heads of
State gathered at the United Nations in September 2005 agreed
that "[e]ach individual State has the responsibility to protect its
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity" and that "[t] his responsibility entails the
prevention of such crimes." 27 Recognizing an international
responsibility to protect people from these atrocities, the Heads of
State also indicated willingness to take collective action, including
Security Council action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter,
"should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are
manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war
28
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity."
But what if the Security Council is unable or unwilling to take
effective action in response to such atrocities? In such a case, many
states would dispute the legality of military action by regional organizations or a coalition of willing states. But other states might well
contend-bolstered by precedents such as Kosovo, the 1991 action
to protect Iraqi civilians in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War,
and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
interventions in Sierra Leone and Liberia-that, in exceptional
factual circumstances, a regional organization or group of states
may lawfully use force for humanitarian purposes to protect victims
of severe atrocities if the Security Council is unable or unwilling to
act. At the very least they may contend that such action, depending on the circumstances, should be considered an "excusable
breach" of the Charter. 2 9 Certainly the UN Charter's rules should
be understood in light of growing commitments to human rights
and clear international legal prohibitions against genocide and
other heinous atrocities. Thus, in this area, as in self-defense, there
may be some gradual, incremental movement in the jus ad bellum.
An evolutionary approach to the jus ad bellum will, no doubt, be
criticized by some legal scholars and lawyers. Advocates of the strict
interpretation of the UN Charter will likely view it as too expansive,
138, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 15, 2005).
27. G.A. Res. 60/1,
28. Id. 139.
29. See Rethinking, suranote 26, at 244-55 (arguing that a norm in support of humanitarian intervention in exceptional factual circumstances may gradually be emerging); see
also Sean D. Murphy, The Intervention in Kosovo: A Law-Shaping Incident?, 94 AM. Soc'v INT'L
L. PROC. 302, 304 (2000) (suggesting that a new gloss on the meaning of Article VIII of the
UN Charter governing regional organizations may be developing).
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while advocates of the highly permissive approach will regard it as
too limited. But, in my view, neither of those alternatives strikes
the correct balance between legal stability and clarity, on the one
hand, and flexibility in response to new and emerging threats, on
the other.
Still, it is worth asking-as some on both ends of the spectrum
do-whether an entirely new paradigm is needed for the jus ad
bellum today, given the new threats we face and the tensions and
disagreements over the Charter's rules. If we were starting from
scratch today, could we come up with something better than an
updated UN Charter framework that could enjoy wide acceptance
among states?
For the reasons I mentioned earlier, we could probably agree
that some baseline non-intervention rule is stabilizing and beneficial. Perhaps we could write a clearer version of Article 2(4)-at
least the core of it; but disagreements would no doubt persist
around the edges. We would certainly agree that a right of selfdefense exists and that states clearly can organize themselves in
self-defense alliances. States facing the most immediate threat
from terrorism would certainly argue for a right of anticipatory
self-defense. Many other states would be worried about other kinds
of aggression-including from other states-and would strongly
resist open-ended concepts of preventive self-defense to future
threats. So we would end up, I think, at a place similar to where I
have argued we are under the UN Charter today.
More complex would be the question of humanitarian intervention-the use of force by a state or group of states to protect the
population of another state from atrocities or severe human rights
abuses. Some would argue for a right of humanitarian intervention in exceptional circumstances and there might be a decent
amount of support for this in situations of genocide or widespread
crimes against humanity. But others would argue strongly that
decisions to intervene should only be taken collectively.
And there's the rub. If we were designing a jus ad bellum regime
today, most states likely would want an international body capable
of acting effectively and collectively in response to "threats to the
peace" and acts of aggression-probably with authority quite similar to that of the Security Council. The problem is not so much the
scope of authority, but rather the composition of such a body. Article 23 of the UN Charter' would be a decent place to start, with its
emphasis on a state's contribution to maintaining international
peace and security, its contribution to the other purposes of the
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United Nations (including protection of human rights and selfdetermination), and "equitable geographical distribution." 30 Certainly, major powers that contribute significantly to peace and
security in their region, or globally, should be included in this
body, particularly if they are also committed to human rights and
to democracy. But agreement on permanent members (particularly if with veto power) would be extraordinarily difficult to
achieve. The United States would likely insist on veto power as the
price of its participation, just as it did in 1945, and other states
might do so as well.
Agreeing on the ultimate composition of a global body would be
an enormous struggle. While some states would be obvious candidates for inclusion because of their military and/or economic contributions to peace and security and their dedication to human
rights and democracy, many different regional powers would be
potential contenders for membership on a Security Council-like
body. In a number of regions, two or three major powers might
demand membership, and, unless the body were to be extremely
large, it might be necessary to alternate between them on a regular
basis. Also, today we should-and probably would-place greater
priority on including democratic states that are strongly committed
to the "responsibility to protect" human beings from atrocities and
to the duty to prevent terrorism. It might be possible to use the
carrot of membership as an incentive for positive behavior, just as
the European Union has sought to do in its neighborhood. But
agreeing on membership would likely be just as deeply contentious
as the current debates over Security Council expansion, unless
clear criteria could be agreed upon for membership with a rotation
system for non-permanent members ample enough to permit wide
participation of eligible countries over time.
Assuming we could eventually agree on the ground-rules and
composition of a new international body (and that's a huge "if"),
my guess is that we might still decide that regional organizations
ought to have somewhat greater authority to protect peace and
security in their regions, so long as they respect human rights and
democracy. We might, for instance, encourage treaty-based
frameworks such as that of ECOWAS, which has established a
30. Article 23 of the UN Charter provides that, in addition to the five permanent
Security Council members, the General Assembly shall elect ten non-permanent members
for two-year terms with "due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and
security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical
distribution." U.N. Charter art. 23, para. 1.
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Mediation and Security Council with authority to intervene in
internal conflicts within member states that "threaten[ ] to trigger
a humanitarian disaster," or in the "event of serious and massive
violation of human rights and the rule of law."3 ' But, at the same
time, we would likely be concerned, just as the Charter's founders
were, to make sure a global body could respond to threats to the
peace on behalf of the international community based on agreed
international rules and procedures. Striking the right balance
between regional and international action in situations other than
self-defense would not be easy.
My point is that creating a dramatically better alternative to the
present system, warts and all, would be extremely challenging.
However, thinking this through helps illuminate some of the serious problems in the current system, such as a Security Council
whose composition fails to include states that make a significant
contribution to peace and security and a consistent failure to weigh
respect for human rights and self-determination heavily enough in
electing members to the Council. Reforming the Security Council
to make it more effective, representative, and seriously committed
to the Charter's multiple purposes is a critical, if daunting, priority. 3 2 Further, coming up with ways to discourage veto-holding permanent members from blocking action when a strong consensus
otherwise exists requires innovation: the idea of "indicative voting,"
for instance, whereby states would indicate and explain their vote
in a preliminary way-giving other states and organizations more
chance to persuade them-may be useful. 33 Finally, much greater
effort is needed to find agreed ways to enforce the responsibility to
31. Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security arts. 10, 25, Dec. 10, 1999, available at http://www.iss.
co.za/af/regorg/unity-to union/pdfs/ecowas/ConflictMecha.pdf. The Protocol also provides for intervention in "cases of aggression or conflict in any Member State or threat
thereof"; in "case of conflict between two or several Member States"; in an internal conflict
"that poses a serious threat to peace and security in the sub-region"; in "the event of an
overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically elected government"; and in "[a ] ny
other situation as may be decided by the Mediation and Security Council." Id. art. 25.
32. For some proposals on this extremely difficult challenge, see High-Level Panel
Report, supra note 17,
244-60; Law and Force, supra note 12, at 641-42; Princeton N.
Lyman, Saving the UN Security Council-A Challengefor the United States, in 4 MAX PLANCK Y.B.
OF U.N. L. 127 (J.A. Frowein & R. Wolfrum eds., 2000); Edward C. Luck, Rediscovering the
Security Council: The High-Level Panel and Beyond, in REFORMING THE UNITED NATIONS FOR
PEACE AND SECURITY 126 (2005),
available at http://www.ycsg.yale.edu/core/forms/
Reforming-un.pdf.
33. For a discussion of indicative voting, see High-Level Panel Report, supra note 17,
257.
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protect against atrocities and the clear counter-terrorism duties of
all states.
In the meantime, the United States can and should work with
friends and allies to forge a reasonable understanding of the right
of self-defense in the face of new and urgent threats-a conception
that can protect our security while preserving the important benefits of an agreed framework governing the use of force. Such an
effort, together with a renewed commitment to the protection of
human rights, can help forge reasonable common ground of the
kind to which Ed Cummings devoted his inspiring life and work.
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